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CONFLICTS OF LAWS 
Tony Angelo 
Pinto v Tindall HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-
001335,7 December 2011 involved the Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934. 
There was a claim to set aside an English 
judgment of late 2010 which had been reg-
istered in New Zealand in March 2011 on 
the grounds of the appeal provision in s 7(1) 
of that Act. Whata J accepted that the fac-
tors relevant to the application were whether 
an appeal was pending or the debtor had a 
real intention to appeal, whether the appeal 
was bona fide and whether the appeal had 
merit (at [18]). The application was dis-
missed after consideration of these factors 
and of the delay taken by the debtor to 
protect his position. 
GVI Logistics Ltd v Goat NZ Ltd HC 
Auckland CIV-2011-404-004407, 7 Decem-
ber 2011 concerned a refrigerated container 
of meat which was transported from New 
Zealand to Japan at incorrect temperature 
settings with consequent loss. The judgment 
considered the relevance of s 9 of the Car-
riage of Goods Act 1979 to the loss, given 
that part of the transport was in New Zealand 
and part international. 
Seed Enhancements Ltd v Agrisource 2000 
Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-004243, 
18 November 2011 involved a protest to 
jurisdiction and the operation of rr 6.27-6.29 
of the High Court Rules. The damage com-
plained of had occurred in New Zealand. 
There was service abroad on the German 
defendant without leave. The Court consid-
ered the various criteria involved and the 
burden of proving that New Zealand is the 
appropriate forum, especially as there was a 
contractual clause giving exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the courts of Hamburg ([50]-[55]). 
The Court held that a New Zealand court 
would not be justified in assuming jurisdic-
tion on the facts of the case and noted "in a 
global context it is about a relationship care-
fully controlled, where the choice of law and 
jurisdiction is agreed, and where there can-
not be any question about the competence of 
or the resolution processes available to ensure 
a proper and just outcome" (at [60]). One 
major factor in the Court's decision was that 
it is likely that two more defendants will be 
joined to the case, one from Canada and one 
from South Korea. Their contracts provided 
for exclusive jurisdiction in Germany. 
FAMILY LAW 
John Caldwell 
Richardson v Richardson 
[2011] NZCA 652 
The parties had separated after a marriage of 
ten years duration. The wife, who had pri-
mary responsibility for the two children, 
applied to the Family Court for spousal main-
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tenance orders. At the time of the Family 
Court hearing the wife was receiving a Domes-
tic Purposes benefit of $166 per week and a 
tax credit, under the Working for Families 
scheme, of $140. In his decision Judge Adams 
stated that the benefits from WINZ were 
irrelevant to his consideration of spousal 
maintenance, and he pointed to s 62 of the 
Family Proceedings Act 1980 which pro-
vides that " .... the liability to maintain any 
person under this Act is not extinguished by 
reason of the fact that the person's reason-
able needs are being met by a domestic ben-
efit". The decision was appealed to the High 
Court, and Harrison J, citing earlier authori-
ties, held that the Family Court judge had 
erred in disregarding the state benefits. Sec-
tion 62, his Honour held, did not support 
the proposition that receipt of a benefit was 
to be excluded from the means assessment. 
His Honour then proceeded to hold that if 
those benefits had been taken into proper 
account the applicant would have had no 
material shortfall in meeting her reasonable 
needs. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal 
was granted on the question of whether Judge 
Adams had been correct to disregard the 
State benefits. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the earlier lead-
ing judgment of the Court in Ropiha v Ropiha 
[1979] 2 NZLR 245 had not been referred to 
by Harrison J. In that case, concerning an 
application for interim maintenance, the Court 
of Appeal had held that the Court would 
generally take no account of the receipt by 
the applicant of a discretionary means-tested 
and regularly adjusted benefit (in that case 
the unemployment benefit) except where the 
defendant could because of his or her circum-
stances be sensibly expected to bear the full 
burden of meeting the maintenance needs of 
the applicant. The Court of Appeal declared 
there were practical as well as policy reasons 
for adopting this approach. The practical 
considerations related to the fact that any 
maintenance sum awarded would result in 
the dollar for dollar abatement of the discre-
tionary State benefit, and the policy consid-
erations related to the need to protect the 
public purse from fiscal demands originating 
from essentially private obligations. 
In Richardson the Court of Appeal affirmed 
the findings and reasoning of its earlier deci-
sion, and held that exactly the same policy 
and practical considerations applied to the 
Domestic Purposes benefit as to the unem-
ployment benefit. Further, the Court of Appeal 
observed that the complexity of both the 
Domestic Purposes and Working for Family 
schemes rendered it highly impractical for 
the Courts to try and take such benefits into 
account in fixing spousal maintenance, and 
that Parliament could never have intended 
such an outcome. For instance, it would 
never have been envisaged that the Commis-
sioner would become involved in assisting 
the Court over the availability of tax credits. 
This decision confirms that when the Court 
comes to assess the means of the applicant in 
maintenance proceedings, the possible receipt 
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of discretionary State benefits will generally 
be excluded from consideration. Mainte-
nance remains a direct, personal obligation 
that, at least as general proposition, is not to 
be shifted to the taxpayer; the State cannot 
be expected to relieve a respondent of his or 
her maintenance responsibilities. In a time of 
such obviously limited State resources, this is 
an approach unlikely to attract much debate. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Anna Kingsbury 
Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly 
&Co 
[2011] UKSC 51 
Under the TRIPS Agreement 1994, for an 
invention to be patentable, it must be "capable 
of industrial application" (art 27(1). This 
requirement is expressed as "useful" in some 
jurisdictions, including New Zealand (Pat-
ents Act 1953, s 41(1)(g), and Patents Bill 
cIllO and 13). Under arts 52 and 57 of the 
European Patent Convention, an invention 
is patentable if it is "susceptible of industrial 
application", and it is susceptible of indus-
trial application "if it can be made or used in 
any kind of industry, including agriculture". 
In this case the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court considered the requirement of indus-
trial applicability, in the context of a patent 
for biological material. The case raised issues 
about whether patents should be granted for 
isolating and identifying biological mol-
ecules before there is certainty about their 
use, or whether patents should only be granted 
for downstream inventions with clearly iden-
tified uses. The BioIndustry Association inter-
vened in the proceedings, arguing that the 
industry needed clarity and certainty in this 
area of law in order to attract investment, 
and that, if the appeal was not allowed, it 
would be appreciably harder for patentees to 
show industrial applicability and conse-
quently to attract investment at early stages 
of research and development. 
The case involved a patent for a novel 
human protein, Neutrokine-o:, which, it was 
contended, had predicted biological proper-
ties and therapeutic activities because it was 
a member of the TNF ligand superfamily. 
That is, it was a patent for an identified 
isolated molecule, the use of which could 
still only be predicted based on what was 
known about other molecules in the "superfam-
ily". Human Genome Sciences (HGS) applied 
for the patent in 1996 and it was granted by 
the European Patent Office (EPO) in 2005. 
Eli Lilly opposed the grant of the patent, and 
brought revocation proceedings in the English 
High Court. In the High Court the patent 
was revoked on the ground that the inven-
tion was not industrially applicable, and an 
appeal to the Court of Appeal was dis-
missed. HGS then appealed to the Supreme 
Court. In parallel proceedings, the Technical 
Board of Appeal of the EPO (the Board) 
upheld the patent. 
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In the Supreme Court, HGS argued that 
the Board was correct and that the Courts 
below had set too high a standard for indus-
trial applicability in the context of a patent 
for biological material. The Supreme Court 
Judges reviewed the relevant jurisprudence, 
noting the lack of authority in the United 
Kingdom itself, and relying on decisions of 
the Board, identified a number of principles 
from those decisions (at [107]). It was open 
to the Supreme Court to decide the patent 
was invalid, but the Court also noted the 
importance of UK patent law aligning itself 
with the jurisprudence of the EPO. The Court 
also considered the wider policy context. 
The Supreme Court Judges all expressed 
the view that generally in cases of this type 
the Court should show deference to the trial 
judge who had evaluated the evidence, and 
to the experience of the presiding Judges in 
the Court of Appeal. However, in this case 
the Supreme Court Judges all concluded that 
the Courts below had applied a test that was 
inconsistent with that developed by the Board, 
that the Board test was the appropriate test, 
and that it produced a different result on the 
facts. The Board test relating to a new pro-
tein and its encoding gene required "plau-
sible" or "reasonably credible" claimed use. 
The Court of Appeal had set a higher stan-
dard. According to Lord Hope (at [151]), 
Jacob LJ in the Court of Appeal appeared: 
. .. to have been looking for a description 
that showed that a particular use for the 
product had actually been demonstrated 
rather than that the product had plausi-
bly been shown to be "usable". 
The Supreme Court Judges considered the 
wider policy concerns, including about the 
possible negative effects of allowing patents 
in biotechnology to be granted for particular 
biological molecules too early in the research 
process, with the risk of closing down com-
petition (at [130]). However, other policy 
considerations, particularly the desirability 
of consistency with EPO decisions and the 
importance of investment in biotechnology 
industries, supported the conclusion that the 
patent should be upheld. The Supreme Court 
allowed the appeal. 
Fonterra Brands (Tip Top Investments) 
Ltd v Tip Top Restaurant Ltd 
HCWellingtonOV2011-485-001011,4 Novem-
ber 2011 
A milk bar, cafe or restaurant named Tip Top 
had operated in central Dunedin since 1936. 
The respondent, Tip Top Restaurant Ltd 
("TTR") had bought the business in 2003, 
and operated a restaurant!cafe/takeaway under 
the Tip Top name. TTR applied to register 
the trade mark TIP TOP in 2007, covering: 
services for providing food and drink; 
restaurant, cafe, cafeteria, snack bar, cof-
fee bar and coffee house, carry out res-
taurant, take out restaurant services, catering 
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services, contract food services, food prepa-
ration, preparation and sale of carry out 
foods and beverages. 
Fonterra Brands was New Zealand's largest 
manufacturer of ice cream and proprietor of 
a number of registered trade marks incorpo-
rating TIP TOP. TIP TOP had been used for 
ice cream and other products in New Zealand 
since 1936, was widely advertised and accounted 
for significant annual sales from retail out-
lets throughout New Zealand. Fonterra Brands 
opposed TTR's trade mark application. The 
Assistant Commissioner rejected Fonterra's 
opposition and allowed TTR's registration 
to proceed. This was an appeal from that 
decision. 
The Assistant Commissioner concluded 
that the proposed TTR marks would not be 
likely to deceive or cause confusion so that 
s 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Trade Marks Act 
2002 did not apply. She also concluded that 
s 25(1)(a) and (b) did not apply, because the 
goods and services covered by the two marks 
were neither the same nor similar. In relation 
to s 25(1)(c), the Assistant Commissioner 
concluded that the respective services were 
not similar, and that use of TTR's proposed 
mark would not be taken as indicating a 
connection in the course of trade with Fonterra. 
On appeal, Fonterra argued that the Assis-
tant Commissioner erred in the application 
of the tests under ss 17, 25(1)(a) and (b) and 
25(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 2002 . 
Ronald Young J disagreed with the Assis-
tant Commissioner, holding that ifTTR were 
to register its mark as proposed there was a 
likelihood of deception and confusion of the 
consuming public. The Judge also found that 
the marks were the same (this was conceded) 
and that the goods and services were similar. 
The Judge therefore held that s 17(1)(a) and 
s 25(1)(a) and (b) applied, so that registra-
tion of the TTR mark was prohibited. The 
Judge also held that s 25(1)(c) applied. He 
held that, as conceded, the TTR trade mark 
was identical to one of the trade marks relat-
ing to TIP TOP held by Fonterra, and that 
survey evidence clearly established that the 
existing Fonterra mark was well known in 
New Zealand, and that the respective goods 
and services were similar. The issue then was 
whether the use of TTR's trade mark would 
be taken as indicating a connection in the 
course of trade between TTR's services and 
Fonterra's goods and likely to prejudice the 
interests of Fonterra. The Judge said that 
many of the consuming public would assume 
TTR's TIP TOP cafe, take-away shop or ice 
cream parlour belonged to or was being 
operated by Fonterra, and it was likely that, 
given the marks were identical and both 
marks related to food products, the public 
would assume a connection between the two. 
This confusion would prejudice Fonterra's 
interests and could result in a loss of brand 
integrity for Fonterra. TTR would also unfairly 
benefit from Fonterra's advertising and brand 
recognition. The Judge held that it was likely 
that the public would think there was a 
connection in trade and that there clearly 
would be prejudice to Fonterra and its trade 
mark. Section 25 (1)( c) therefore also applied. 
The Judge considered s 26, as s 25 was 
subject to s 26, the exception for honest 
concurrent use. The Judge noted that s 17(1)( a) 
was not subject to s 26, and given that 
s 17(1)(a) applied, the use of the TIP TOP 
mark was prohibited by s 17. The Judge 
nevertheless considered s 26 for the sake of 
completeness. TTR submitted that, if it was 
found that s 25 applied, then TTR wished to 
invoke s 26(1)(b), honest concurrent use, so 
that the trade mark could be registered. The 
Judge, Citing VB Distributors v Matsushita 
Electrical Industrial Co Ltd (1999) 9 TCLR 
349 said that the issue here of honest con-
current use involved an assessment of: 
(a) the extent of the use of both the exist-
ing and proposed mark; 
(b) the extent of confusion, if any, between 
the work; 
(c) the honesty of use of the proposed 
mark; 
(d) public convenience if the mark was 
registered. 
The Judge said that the Fonterra mark was 
well known and widely used throughout 
New Zealand whereas TTR's mark was likely 
to be well known in Dunedin in relation to 
the restaurant, but not more widely. As found, 
the potential for confusion and deception 
was widespread. In relation to the honesty of 
the use, the Judge said that the current use of 
the TIP TOP brand for the restaurant in the 
Octagon in Dunedin was long standing, and 
there was no reason to think the current and 
past use of TIP TOP by the restaurant given 
its historic connection and the continuity of 
its use was anything other than honest. How-
ever, TTR's plans to expand the TTR brand 
TIP TOP beyond Dunedin's borders together 
with the possible extension of businesses 
with the name TIP TOP did bring into ques-
tion the motives for the expansion using the 
TIP TOP name, and raised the question whether 
this was an opportunistic application designed 
by TTR to trade on the existing TIP TOP 
trade mark and thereby advantage itself. The 
potential for confusion or deception of the 
public meant public inconvenience was sig-
nificant. The Judge was satisfied of honest 
concurrent use with regard to a restaurant! 
cafe business in and around central Dunedin 
but not otherwise. However, since s 17 (1) (a) 
applied, s 26 had no application. The Judge 
allowed the appeal. 
The outcome was determined in large 
part by the scope of the trade mark applica-
tion. The Judge found that use of the mark 
would be likely to deceive or cause confu-
sion, and the broad scope of the application, 
which would even allow TTR to run a "TIP 
TOP" ice cream parlour, was an essential 
element of that decision. The other impor-
tant element in the decision was the survey 
evidence showing that TIP TOP ice cream 
had high levels of brand awareness. 0 
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